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FREE SPEECH IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
AND ITS RELATION TO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A
CONSIDERATION OF MILL,
MEIKLEJOHN, AND PLATO
Murray Dry*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The American Constitution's success, according to its Founders, required that the people understand the document. One
telling argument for adding a bill of rights to the Constitution
was that "if a nation means its systems, religious or political, shall
have duration, it ought to recognize the leading principles of
them in the front page of every family book."t If we assume this
is true for constitutional law as well, the Supreme Court's treatment of freedom of speech is cause for our concern. Not only
has the Court decided controversial free speech cases with increasingly complicated doctrines, but it has extended protection
to expressive activities which citizens do not ordinarily associate
with freedom of speech. For example, in 1992 the Supreme
Court invalidated a bias motivated crime ordinance under which
a young man was convicted for having burned a cross inside the
fenced yard of a black family.z While the decision was unanimous, only a bare majority of the Court agreed on the reasoning:
while the prohibited expression came under the "fighting words"
categorical exception to protected speech, the "content neutrality" rule should be applied nonetheless; under that rule the ordinance failed, since certain, but not all, "fighting words" were
selected for prohibition on the basis of the message conveyed.3
Similarly, even when a government regulation is upheld, what
* Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College. I wish to thank Eve Adler,
Paul Dry, Russell Leng, Todd Molz, and Jim Stoner for reading and commenting on an
earlier draft of this paper.
1. Federal Farmer XVI, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist
324 (U. of Chicago, 1981).
2. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 504 U.S. - (1992).
3. Id. at 2548-50.
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the Justices call "protected expression" is at times hard to square
with the high-toned justifications for protecting free speech. The
major free speech case in 1991 involved nude dancing at the Kitty
Kat Lounge.4 In a 5-4 decision upholding a public indecency
statute that prohibited nude dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge, a
majority of the Court was unable to affirm that the government's
interest in banning nudity in places of public accommodations
was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Justice Souter, who cast the deciding vote, wrote that "such performance
dancing is inherently expressive," and thus "subject to a degree
of first amendment protection," but he went on to explain his
vote with reference to "the State's substantial interest in combating the secondary effects [e.g., likelihood of prostitution] of
[such] adult entertainment establishments."s First Amendment
scholar Frederick Schauer attributes the reasoning in cases such
as R.A. V. and Barnes to "the process of abstraction" whereby
Nazis become political speakers, profit maximizing purveyors
of sexually explicit material become proponents of an alternate vision of social existence, glorifiers of sexual violence
against women become advocates of a point of view, quiet residential streets become public forums, and negligently false
harmful statements about private matters become part of a robust debate about issues of public importance.6

The Supreme Court has drawn much of its understanding of
freedom of speech from the famous Holmes-Brandeis opinions in
the "subversive advocacy" cases from 1919-1927. These opinions
assumed that the "marketplace of ideas" should be perfectly free
of governmental restraint, because truth will win out and the best
response to harmful speech is more speech, unless there is a
"clear and present danger" of a substantive evil that government
has a right to prohibit.7 The most recent development of this
doctrine permits government to outlaw advocacy only when it "is
4. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 501 U.S. - (1991).
5. Id. at 2468.
6. Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 397 (1989), a review of Kalven's posthumously published book, Harry Kalven, Jr., A
Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America (Harper & Row, 1988).
7. "[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see also Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); and Whitney v. California, 274
u.s. 357 (1927).
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directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action. "s
This development is part of a treatment of freedom of
speech which starts by distinguishing categories of unprotected
speech, including incitement, obscenity, and "fighting words,"
from all other speech, which is protected. Protected speech cannot be prohibited and can only be regulated, as part of a "time,
place and manner" regulation or as incidental to a regulation of
conduct, if the regulation is "content" and "viewpoint" neutral.
This means that protected speech cannot be treated differently
on the basis of subject matter or point of view. As a result of the
"hate speech" decision discussed above, the content neutrality
rule now applies even to unprotected speech. When both symbolic expression, such as draft card or flag burning, and offensive
expression, such as wearing "F_ the Draft" on a jacket in a public place, are included within the First Amendment, we arrive at
our current legal condition on free speech. Do we really believe
that such an extensive freedom of expression is good for our polity, that the truth, whatever that might mean as applied to nude
dancing or cross burning, wins out, and that no harm results from
such enforced permissiveness? To begin a reconsideration of
these questions, I want to examine the philosophic source of our
current views on free expression.
Modern political philosophy, as developed in the writings of
Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, has provided the foundation for our Constitution and for modern liberal
constitutionalism generally. Government's purpose is limited to
the securing of individual rights and its authority comes from the
people, who give their consent (in the versions of Locke and
Montesquieu, which the American Founders followed) via representatives. In addition, the powers of government are arranged
in and divided among different branches, which include a separation of powers among the political branches of government and
an independent judiciary.
Turning specifically to freedom of speech, while Spinoza,
Locke, and Montesquieu discuss the subject in a manner consistent with their emphasis on securing rights, John Stuart Mill
(whose teaching draws on the previous philosophers) and Alexander Meiklejohn are the most prominent proponents of the free

8.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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speech doctrine the Court has followed.9 Thomas Emerson's
well-known list of reasons for the importance of freedom of
speech to comes in large part from Mill, with a hint of Meiklejohn.
Gerald Gunther, who quotes from Emerson's list, also identifies
Mill and Meiklejohn as prominent sources for explaining the importance of free speech. As I will show shortly, the Court's approach to freedom of speech embodies Mill's position. In
addition, Harry Kalven's famous article on the New York Times
libel case and Justice Brennan's article both made Meiklejohn a
household name among students of the First Amendment.u
In their writings on free speech, Mill and Meiklejohn both
cite Socrates.tz Mill addresses the unsettling effect Socrates had
on the Athenian citizens and the extreme action they took in response, i.e., capital punishment. Meiklejohn attempts to reconcile Socrates's speech in the Apology with his refusal to allow his
friends to spring him from jail in the Crito. This material is important for American constitutional law because our understanding of freedom of speech depends upon our understanding of the
relationship between political activity and the activity of thought
generally, that is, philosophic reflection, scientific inquiry, and artistic expression. Our current free speech doctrines assume a
fundamental harmony between these two activities. If this harmony cannot be assumed, as I intend to show with this examination of Mill, Meiklejohn, and Plato, then the Supreme Court's
justifications for upholding free speech claims, and its very decisions in certain cases, will need to be reconsidered.

9. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Stefan Collini, ed., Cambridge U. Press, 1989);
Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People
(Harper & Brothers, 1960).
10. Freedom of speech is important (1) "as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment"; (2) as "an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth"; (3) as
"essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society"; and
(4) as "a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community, of
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."
Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-1 (Random House, 1970).
11. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 996 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991);
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First
Amendment", 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191; William Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
12. Mill's discussion refers to the Athenian trial, the condemnation and the execution of Socrates, whereas Meiklejohn refers explicitly to Plato's account of these events.
My discussion of Socrates will always mean Plato's Socrates, except where I refer to Xenophon's account of Socrates' trial.
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II. THE MODERN VIEW OF FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO FREE GOVERNMENT
Mill's arguments in On Liberty concern civil liberty in general, as his thesis indicates.
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society
with the individual in the way of compulsion and control,
whether the means used by physical force in the form of legal
penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action
of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.13

Presenting the foundation for this principle in chapter three, Mill
argues that "the free development of individuality is one of the
leading essentials of well-being," and that "the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of
thinking, as having any intrinsic worth .... "t4 Likening human
nature to a "tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all
sides," as opposed to "a machine to be built after a model," Mill
argues that the more desires and feelings one has the more one
has "of the raw material of human nature."ts Such a formulation
suggests the need for strong government for security, as Hobbes
argued. Mill, however, posits a social part of human nature as he
claims that "there is a full equivalent in the better development
of the social part of [that] nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part."t6 This seems to be Mill's way
of denying any tension between the good of an individual and the
common good.
We thus approach Mill's argument for free speech in light of
the overall object of the work: to minimize governmental and social control over individuals-at least over adults in advanced societies-in order to allow them to fully develop their unique
natures. Mill argues that the free expression of opinions, in
13. Mill, On Liberty at 13 (cited in note 9). This work was first published in 1859.
The thesis applies to mature human beings and to advanced, or non-backward, societies
(despotism may be appropriate for less advanced societies, if the end is their improvement). The thesis argues for limits on social constraints as well as on legal, or criminal,
ones.
14. Id. at 57.
15. Id. at 60.
16. Id. at 63.
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speech and writing, does not lead to any social harm. Mill goes
on to put a limit on free speech which anticipates the Supreme
Court's "clear and present danger" test:
even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An
opinion that com-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment
when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a com-dealer, or when handed about among the
same mob in the form of a placard.17

Mill makes a threefold classification for analyzing society's dominant opinions in relation to "the liberty of thought and discussion."ts First, the opinion which society wishes to suppress may
be true, and those who wish to suppress it are incorrectly assuming infallibility. He presents and responds to two counterarguments here. In the first case, forbidding the propagation of error
no more presupposes infallibility than any other form of acting
on the basis of one's judgment. He responds that there is a significant difference "between presuming an opinion to be true,
because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been
refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting
its refutation."t9 The second counterargument is from utility. To
this claim Mill replies that "[t]he usefulness of an opinion is itself
a matter of opinion" and that "[t]he truth of an opinion is part of
its utility. "2o
In the second case, the received opinion, society's orthodoxy, may be true, and the challenging opinions may be false.
But this does not justify suppression of those challenging opinions, Mill says, since rational beings must be in a position to
know the truth, not simply hold it from authority. This is especially true in matters of "morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life," where "three-fourths of the
arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from it."2 1 Mill
maintains that the arguments of adversaries must be heard not
17. Id. at 56. This "mob rule" example, occurring within the civilized society that is
supposedly advanced enough for full freedom of speech, seems to point to a broader
problem than Mill is willing to acknowledge.
18. That is the title to chapter two, which contains Mill's free speech argument.
19. ld. at 22.
20. Id. at 25.
21. ld. at 38.
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simply by able teachers but by the adversaries themselves,
"presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they
offer as refutations. "22 According to Mill, over time mankind
will agree on more and more important doctrines. To the
counterargument that only the few, not mankind in general, need
to have full knowledge of "all that can be said either against or
for their opinions," Mill replies that "in the present state of the
world," given the widespread availability of writing, such a proposal "is practically impossible. "23
The third case presents a mixed situation, which is the most
common: the "conflicting doctrines" may "share the truth between them. "24 In elaborating on this position, Mill refers to
Rousseau's critique of the Enlightenment and then to Christian
morality. I will return to this argument below.
Mill paints an attractive picture of critical open-mindedness
in the service of full human development. At the same time, his
confidence in the progressive development of mankind, which
seems to justify his ambition to reduce the authority of society as
well as government, leads to unreasonable expectations. Consider his discussion of the suppression of Socrates, of Jesus, and
of Christianity by Marcus Aurelius. For Mill, the first two cases
involve the State's suppression of a moral exemplar and the third
case involves a moral man's misguided attempt to suppress a
moral teaching foreign to him. Mill does not emphasize the distinctive teachings of Socrates, Jesus, or Rome, nor does he bewail
the loss of great men. Rather he directs attention to the illeffects of suppression per se. His confidence in the benefits of
individual development accounts for his position on truth. According to Mill, the dictum that "truth always triumphs over persecution" is "one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat
after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all
experience refutes."25 He does, however, believe that "when an
opinion is true," men will periodically rediscover it until "some
one of its reappearances falls upon a time when from favorable
circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head
as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it."26
22. Id. at 38.
23. Id. at 39-40. This is an important point, since it seems to tell against any return
to the position of classical political philosophy. It also has wider implications in the age of
television. Still, if the assumed harmony, over time, between the few and the many does
not occur, we may need to rethink the questions of practical application.
24. ld. at 47.
25. Id. at 31-32.
26. Id. at 31.
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So truth is resilient and suppression of opinion is harmful.
But what is this thing called "truth" that gains adherence over
time? Since human liberty is a natural good, the more people are
given a chance to be free, the more they will develop their individuality. Moreover, freedom of thinking, and hence speaking
and writing,
is as much and even more indispensable, to enable average
human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. There have been, and may again be, great individual
thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there
never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people.27

An intellectually active people must be involved in controversy
over important subjects. Only then can "the mind of a people
[be] stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse [be] given
which [can raise] even persons of the most ordinary intellect to
something of the dignity of thinking beings. "zs
Truth for Mill, then, is the rights of man and the advancement of science for the relief of man's estate, the truth of the
Enlightenment. The political truths regarding rights, security,
and full self-development are as likely to find favor with a people
that is allowed to hear all opinions as scientific truths are likely to
win the assent of disinterested scientists. The challenge is to get
well intentioned people to see that coercion, social or governmental, need not go beyond self-protection, since if it does, it is
unnecessary and harmful to full self-development.
Mill's position on coercion explains his treatment of Rousseau and his final treatment of Christianity, contained in part
three of the argument. Rousseau argued, in part from the perspective of the ancient city, that the restoration of the sciences
and arts, the Enlightenment, does not purify morals, because the
sciences and the arts look up to the universalism of philosophy
and science while morality reflects the particularism of one's city
and the demands of citizenship.29 For Mill, Rousseau made a
temporary contribution but he was more wrong than right: his
"paradoxes ... explode[d] like bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional
27.
28.
29.
Masters,

Id. at 36.
Id. at 36.
See Rousseau, First Discourse in The First and Second Discourses (Royer D.
ed. & Roger D. Masters & Judith R. Masters, trans., St. Martin's Press, 1964).
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ingredients."3o In other words, Rousseau's criticism of the arts
and sciences for their deleterious effects on the citizenry of a free
republic did not require any fundamental reconsideration of individual self-development and free society.
Mill treats Christianity with more circumspection. He does
not want to offend his audience by denying categorically that
Christian morality is true. He does say that the Gospel's
precepts are confined "to the particulars in which that morality
was to be corrected, or superceded by a wider and higher [one];
expressing itself, moreover, in terms most general, often impossible to be interpreted literally, and possessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence than the precision of
legislation."3t Criticizing "so-called" Christian morality for being
negative and passive rather than positive and active, Mill can still
claim that
the sayings of Christ ... are irreconcilable with nothing which
a comprehensive morality requires; that everything which is
excellent in ethics may be brought within them, with no
greater violence to their language than has been done to it by
all who have attempted to deduce from them any practical system of conduct whatever. "32

Mill was not the first modern philosopher to criticize Christianity so tactfully that not every reader would understand, but he
was the first to express such confidence in the positive effects of
full and free discussion on important beliefs. He seems to have
thought that zealous religious convictions would become a thing
of the past.
Alexander Meiklejohn is Mill's intellectual heir, applying
some of Mill's ideas to specific cases and questions. In Free
Speech and its Relation to Self-Government, first published in
1948, Meiklejohn advocated a wider scope for freedom of speech
than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "clear and present danger" test had allowed up to that time.33 Like Mill,
Meiklejohn believes that when all opinions are heard, the results
will be beneficial for civil society. His emphasis is on the citizens'
responsibility for collective deliberation in a democratic form of
government. Meiklejohn draws on the Constitution's preamble
30. Mill, On Liberty at 48 (cited in note 9).
31. Id. at 49-50.
32. Id. at 51.
33. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (cited in
note 9). Part one of this book is a second edition of Meiklejohn's Free Speech and its
Relation to Self-Govemmenr, part two contains additional papers. My discussion draws
on the first part of the original work, which is entitled "The Rulers and the Ruled."
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to interpret the First Amendment. "We, the People, acting together, either directly or through our representatives, make and
administer law. We, the People, acting in groups or separately,
are subject to the law. "34 Free speech cannot be abridged by the
self-governing community, because it would deny to citizens "information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism" which
they need to make decisions.3s "It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed."36
Because it emphasizes matters of citizen deliberation,
Meiklejohn's argument has reinforced the idea that the First
Amendment only protects political speech. This position was
criticized by scholars and in response Meiklejohn expanded his
own definition of political speech.37 But Meiklejohn was right to
emphasize the political speech of citizen critics of government,
because otherwise freedom of speech becomes a part of a general
individual liberty, a freedom from government. His insistence on
a qualitative distinction between freedom of speech and a general liberty, which is subject to regulation under the due process
clause, has found some support in constitutionallaw.3s
But Meiklejohn's use of the concept of the traditional town
meeting to elaborate his free speech argument does not acknowledge the significance of representation for modem free government. The citizens choose a moderator who "calls the meeting to
order," requires debaters to confine their remarks to "the question before the house," maintains orderly discussion, and makes
sure "that everything worth saying shall be said" (assuming, of
course, that such is consistent with Robert's Rules of Order).3 9
Using the example of a school board, Meiklejohn writes that
questions concerning where to locate a school, who should teach,
what should be taught are matters for full and free discussion and
decision. No policy "shall be denied a hearing because it is on
34. Id. at 15.
35. ld. at 27.
36. Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
37. Schauer notes the difficulties in defining political speech in Frederick F. Schauer,
Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 44-45,211 n.9 (Cambridge U. Press, 1982). Robert
Bork has interpreted the Framers' intentions on free speech as limited to political speech,
in his Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971).
Meiklejohn expanded the reach of political speech to include philosophy, science, literature, and the arts in The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 257.
38. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation of Self-Government at 8-9 (cited in note
33). This resembles the Supreme Court's "preferred position" approach to individual liberties. Cf. Justice Stone's footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144
(1938).
39. ld. at 24-26.
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one side of the issue rather than another."40 He adds that "(n]o
plan of action shall be outlawed because someone in control
thinks it unwise, unfair, un-American. No speaker may be declared 'out of order' because we disagree with what he intends to
say."4t
Since Meiklejohn has the Smith Act's outlawing of the Communist Party in mind, we might ask whether he is referring to the
proposal to bring about violent revolution or to the proposal to
outlaw organizations advocating violent revolution as a rule of
action. The abolition question might well come before the house,
but it would be a representative legislature. How would the violent revolution question "come before the house"? If this is
Meiklejohn's way of describing the people's right to alter or abolish government, is that not a pre-political natural right which
cannot be constitutionally recognized?42 And if the intention is
to have all matters come before the sovereign people through
their representatives, a legislative decision to outlaw the Communist Party does not prevent a reconsideration of such a measure
in the future. But whenever the Supreme Court nullifies a law
for abridging freedom of speech, it prohibits the citizen body
from deliberating and deciding on the matter altogether.
Meiklejohn's "self government" argument fails to make a persuasive case for such an extensive freedom from government.43
Does Meiklejohn assume that full disclosure to rational
adults, no matter what the arena, no matter how potentially dangerous a secret association might be, will always produce beneficial results and never produce irreparable harms? I think so. His
interpretation of Socrates, from the Apology and Crito, illustrates his position and also reveals the weakness of his argument.
According to Meiklejohn, "[i]n both dialogues, Plato is considering the right which a government has to demand obedience
from its citizens .... The question is whether or not Socrates is in
duty bound to obey the government. In the Apology the answer
40. ld. at 27.
41. Id.
42. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government chapters XIII, XIX (J.W.
Gough, ed., Barnes & Noble, 1966), the Declaration of Independence, and Lincoln's First
Inaugural on this point.
43. Frederick Schauer makes a similar point in his discussion of Meiklejohn's position in Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry at 37-45 (cited in note 37). Schauer, following Mill, thinks that the "fallibility argument" is the only persuasive reason for limiting
government. He also cites Tocqueville, but that author is more sensitive to the special
threats posed by associations, as opposed to sole individuals. See Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 191, 193 (J.P. Mayer, ed., Doubleday, 1969).
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is 'No.' In the Crito, the answer is 'Yes'.''44 Meiklejohn claims
that Plato's Socrates has provided a consistent and defensible position toward law-abidingness and he finds that position in the
American Constitution also. In the Apology, the city charges
Socrates with corrupting the young and not believing in the gods
of the city. Meiklejohn writes:
On the evidence presented by a kind of un-Athenian Subversive Activities Committee he is found guilty. His judges do
not wish to put him to death, but they warn him that, unless he
will agree to stop his teaching or to change its tenor, they must
order his execution. And to this demand for obedience to a
decree abridging his freedom of speech, Socrates replies with a
flat and unequivocal declaration of disobedient independence.
My teaching, he says, is not, in that sense, under the abridging
control of the government. Athens is a free city. No official,
no judge, he declares, may tell me what I shall, or shall not,
teach or think. He recognizes that the government has the
power and the legal right to put him to death. But so far as the
content of his teaching is concerned, he claims unqualified independence. 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech,' he seems to be saying. 45

Meiklejohn interprets Socrates's defense as a "First Amendment" argument to his judges, to the effect that they have no
right to inquire into his beliefs and teachings. I return to this
below.
In the Crito, Socrates refuses to accept his friend's offer of
help to escape jail, and hence execution. Socrates constructed a
dialogue between himself and the laws of Athens to show his
friend that he had consented to live under those laws all his life,
enjoying the rights and privileges of Athenian citizenship. How
can he now, when his life is threatened, unilaterally remove his
consent? Meiklejohn, accepting Socrates's argument at face
value, argues that while government may not limit a man's freedom of thought, it can deprive someone of his life or property
after giving him a fair trial. Hence, the lesson from Plato, according to Meiklejohn, confirmed in the language of the First
Amendment, is that civil disobedience based on belief or conviction is permissible, but refusal to accept whatever punishment
follows from due process of law is not.46
44. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government at 22 (cited in note
33).

45. Id.
46. Meiklejohn thus anticipates Martin Luther King's famous argument for civil
disobedience.
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In summary, Mill and Meiklejohn offer a defense of freedom
of speech which draws on Plato's Apology of Socrates. Both assume that Athens was wrong and Socrates, as an individual asserting his rights, was right. Thming to Plato, I want to show that
the correct interpretation of these two dialogues, by themselves
and in conjunction with the Republic, yields a more complicated,
but also more instructive teaching.
Ill. FREE SPEECH IN CLASSICAL POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: A RECONSIDERATION OF
PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES
AND CRITO

In Plato's version of the trial, Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon
make the following charge: "Socrates does injustice by corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the
city believes, but in other diamonia [daimonic, or godlike, things
or beings] that are novel."47 After Socrates is found guilty, by a
vote of approximately 280-220, the accusers, on behalf of the city,
propose the death penalty. The jury, after hearing Socrates propose "tenure for life" as his "penalty," chooses death.4s The two
substantive questions are, what does Socrates claim for himself
and what does he allow the city? Before examining them, however, I consider the character of this dialogue and Socrates's remarks about his defense speech and speech in general.
The Apology is the only Platonic dialogue in which Socrates
is presented in a conversation with the entire city of Athens, that
is, with the randomly selected five hundred-man jury. In all the
other dialogues in which Socrates appears, he speaks with a select few. Socrates insists that his interlocutor and he must be the
judges, not some external jury, and that question and answer,
rather than long speeches, be employed. Furthermore, in the
Phaedrus, Socrates criticizes writing as frozen speech, which says
the same thing to everyone, and he praises speaking for allowing
the speaker to tailor his remarks to the specific audience.
Socrates has a popular and hostile audience in the Apology.
Such an audience will affect his ability to instruct his listeners,
47. Plato and Aristophanes: Four Texts on Socrates 73 (24b-c) (Thomas G. West &
Grace Starry West, trans., Cornell U. Press, 1984).
48. If the death penalty and the criminal process are both taken out of the case, we
can imagine a modem version of Socrates' condition: having a teacher and scholar who is
up for tenure defend himself against the charges that his teachings, opinions, or beliefs
are detrimental to the students and harmful to the larger community. The American
Association of University Professors' principles on academic freedom follow the arguments of Mill and Meiklejohn.
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and hence it will affect what he says. Socrates claims at the beginning of his speech that unlike his accusers, who are clever
speakers but liars, he will tell the simple unadorned truth; it is, he
claims, the only way he knows, since at seventy this is his first
time in a law court as a defendant. Socrates implies that all that
is necessary for justice is truth telling. But at the end of the dialogue, he contradicts his first statement by indicating that he
could have spoken differently. Now it appears that if he had
wanted to save his life at all costs, he could have spoken shamelessly, saying what needed to be said to please his hearers.49 The
latter statement is consistent with Socrates's remark about the
flexibility of speaking, whereas the first statement about simply
telling the truth is not. Socrates's two accounts of his manner of
speaking give some indication of the meaning of Socratic irony
and suggest the need to approach the critical arguments on the
charges carefully.
Turning to his defense, Socrates begins with the corruption
charge. He asks who makes the youth better. After first saying
that the laws do, Meletus (in response to Socrates's prodding)
gives the democratic answer that the citizen judges ("all of
them") are able to educate the young.5o Socrates notes that in
the training of horses it is the few who know, rather than the
many who do not, who make them better. Socrates suggests two
possible reference points for rearing the young: on the basis of
knowledge of human excellence simply or on the basis of what a
given political association, or body politic, looks up to.
The second charge against Socrates is that he teaches the
youth "not [to] believe[ ] in the gods in whom the city believes,
but in other daimonia that are novel."51 His response to this
charge is very different from what Meiklejohn says it is. After
getting Meletus to expand on the charge by asserting that he is an
atheist,52 Socrates can point out that Meletus has contradicted his
own indictment, according to which Socrates believes in, or introduces, daimonia, godlike things or beings, that are novel.53
According to Leo Strauss, "[t]his refutation is so beautiful be49. Plato and Aristophanes: Four Texts on Socrates at 93 (38d) (cited in note 47).
50. Id. at 74 (24e).
51. Id. at 73 (24b-c).
52. [S] "Or do you assert that I myself do not believe in gods at all and that I teach
this to others?" [M] "This is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all." Id. at 76
(26c).
53. Id. at 76-78 (26b-27d). The daimon is Plato's Socrates's ironic way of describing
some of his actions, such as a decision to stay out of political life; he refers to it later in the
dialogue as not having opposed his form of defense.
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cause it leaves entirely open whether Socrates believes in the
gods of the city."54
Perhaps Socrates does not believe in the gods of the city and
the city may rightfully be concerned about that. Unlike Mill and
Meiklejohn, Plato's Socrates does not expect, or even think, that
a philosopher can live in full harmony with a city, i.e., a political
community. The complex relationship between philosophy, or
the life of the mind, and politics involves more than the city's
having a claim on its citizens, however, because Socrates has a
claim on the city. Socrates presents his account of his way of life
by constructing a hypothetical argument on behalf of the jurors:
that they will let him go on condition "that you no longer spend
time in this investigation or philosophize; and if you are caught
doing this you will die. "55 To this Socrates responds
I, men of Athens, salute you and love you, but I will obey the
god rather than you; as long as I breathe and am able to, I will
certainly not stop philosophizing, and I will exhort you and
explain this to whomever of you I happen to meet, and I will
speak just the sorts of things I am accustomed to: 'Best of
men, you are an Athenian, from the city that is greatest and
best reputed for wisdom and strength: are you not ashamed
that you care for having as much money as possible, and reputation, and honor, but that you neither care for nor give
thought to prudence, and truth, and how your soul will be the
best possible?'.56

In this popular presentation of philosophy, the emphasis is on
exhortation rather than inquiry, the care of the soul is moral
rather than intellectual, and the activity, like law-abidingness,
can be expected of everyone. On this formulation, there is no
inherent tension between the life of philosophy and the demands
of politics. If Plato's Socrates were serious about this account,
both Mill and Meiklejohn would be right to portray the conflict
between Athens and Socrates as they do: that an overzealous
democratic city made a tragic mistake because it was unable to
recognize the moral and intellectual contribution that Socrates
was making to the city.
54. Plato's Apology of Socrates and Crito, in Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy 44 (U. of Chi. Press, 1983). This is especially noteworthy; the Greek word
which is translated "believe in" ("nomizein") can also mean "publicly acknowledge" or
"worship," and in Xenophon's version of Socrates' defense, he has Socrates deny the
charge by asserting that many Athenians have seen him sacrificing to the gods. Socrates'
Defence to the Jury, in IV Works of Xenophon 646-47 (Loeb Classical Lib., Harv. U.
Press, 1923).
55. Plato and Aristophanes: Four Texts on Socrates at 81 (29d-e) (cited in note 47).
56. Id.
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But there is abundant evidence in the Apology, which is further confirmed by the Republic, that Socrates's popular presentation of his philosophic way of life cannot be taken literally. First,
we noted how the simple unadorned truth does not necessarily
get itself accepted by a democratic jury, precisely because, as
Meletus showed, a democratic people is suspicious of any claim
that any one or few persons possess political wisdom. Second,
Socrates's refusal to address the relationship between the city's
gods and his way of life suggests that there is not a simple harmony between the requirements of politics and the life of the
mind.s7 Socrates acknowledges this shortly afterward by first likening himself to "some gadfly" who awakens a "great and wellborn horse who is rather sluggish" and then by saying that he has
had to avoid political life to survive.
For know well, men of Athens, if I had long ago attempted to
be politically active, I would long ago have perished . . . .
Rather, if someone who really fights for the just is going to
preserve himself even for a short time, it is necessary for him
to lead a private rather than a public life.ss

After Socrates is found guilty, he explains again why he cannot keep silent:
[I]f I say that this even happens to be a great good for a
human being-to make speeches every day about virtue and
the other things about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and others-and that the unexamined life
is not worth living for a human being, you will be persuaded
by me still less when I say these things.s9

This account of philosophy does not include exhortation and
does not imply that the activity is embraceable by all. Socrates
did not spend his time conversing with the man on the street.
The Republic gives a fuller account of why the philosophic life is
necessarily in conflict with the demands of politics. The desires
of most human beings are for goods that are connected to the
particularity of body and hence cannot be truly shared. On the
other hand, if political life is to reflect true human dignity, it
needs to look up to the universal human capacity for thought and
57. The Republic does not teach the contrary, since the perfect regime, in which the
philosopher rules, requires, among other things, the elimination of the family, which is
contrary to natural desire and hence not possible. In addition, the few philo~ophers in the
perfect city are different in kind from the many non·philosophers, whose hves are based
on opinion, not knowledge. See Republic VII (Allan Bloom trans., B~ic ~ooks, 1968).
58. Plato and Aristophanes: Four Texts on Socrates at 82 (30e) (cited m note 47).
59. Id. at 92 (38a).
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reflection on the nature of things. That activity both transcends
politics but also ultimately dignifies it. In that sense, Socrates
was not speaking foolishly when he described himself as a gadfly
or when he proposed what amounted to "lifetime tenure" on the
part of the city as what he deserved from the city.
Since Meiklejohn attempted to reconcile the Crito with the
Apology, I want to consider that dialogue briefly. In it, Socrates's good friend comes to see him in jail and urges him to go
along with an escape plan that he and his friends have devised.
The reason Socrates gives for not going along may have more to
do with Crito than with the truth. After all, at the end of the
Apology Socrates first spoke to his condemners, chastising them
for their foolishness:
For the sake of a little time, men of Athens, you will get a
name and be charged with the responsibility, by those wishing
to revile the city, for having killed Socrates, a wise man ....
For you see that my age is already far advanced in life and
close to death.60

Crito's own personal expression of concern for Socrates plus the
absence of any treatment of philosophy in the dialogue6t suggest
that Socrates is addressing a non-philosophic friend. Hence he
makes an argument from the laws which abstracts from the difference, highlighted in the Apology, between those who make
the laws and those who might have true knowledge of politics. If
the truly just man must lead a private life, how can it be said that
the just Socrates has been reared by the laws, and therefore owes
a pious duty to obey the laws? In his speech in the Apology,
Socrates indicated that he would have disobeyed a hypothetical
law explicitly prohibiting philosophy. In the Crito, he argues for
categorical law-abidingness. The argument has a surface plausibility, apparently enough to make Crito feel better about Socrates's execution. In light of Socrates's remark about his age at the
end of the Apology, we are invited to wonder what he would
have done if he had faced execution at age thirty-five. Contrary
to Meiklejohn, Plato teaches that the tension between the requirements of political life and the good of the individual cannot
be resolved by allowing full freedom of expression as long as
criminal punishment for that expression follows due process.
Nor can we assume that the special claim Socrates made on be60. ld. at 92 (3&).
61. The word "soul'" is noticeably absent precisely when one would expect it from
the context; see id. at 105 (47d). Leo Strauss points this out in Plato's Apology of Socrates
and Crito at 58 (cited in note 54).
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half of his distinctive way of life, philosophy, can be extended to
every individual's chosen way of life.
CONCLUSION: APPLYING CLASSICAL POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY TO FREE SPEECH AND FREE
GOVERNMENT UNDER LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
The Supreme Court's free speech doctrines assume the best
results from the widest possible freedom of expression and fear
the worst results if any distinctions are made on the basis of the
content of the ideas expressed. Likewise, the Court does not distinguish between an individual and an association, between
speech and symbolic expression, or between civil speech and vulgar speech. Perhaps we should not hold Mill and Meiklejohn responsible for every development in our constitutional law on free
speech, but their arguments support the contention that the fullest freedom of expression is good and that governmental or social restraints on individuals are only justified by an immediate
threat to security. They favor freedom as an unqualified good
because they assume a fundamental harmony between the life of
inquiry and political life. Since they both refer to Socrates for
support, I examined the Apology and Crito to show that Plato's
account does not support their position and moreover that
Plato's account of a tension between the demands of a healthy
political life and the good of the individual is superior to theirs.
Plato provides further evidence for his position in book eight of
the Republic, where Socrates describes democracy as the regime
of freedom, which means the people look up to the "equality of
the pleasures. "62 According to Socrates, such a view of the good
life is accompanied by the following speeches:
[N]aming shame simplicity, they push it out with dishonor, a fugitive; calling moderation cowardliness and spattering it with mud, they banish it; persuading that measure and
orderly expenditure are rustic and illiberal, they join with
many useless desires in driving them over the frontier ....
Now, once they have emptied and purged these from the soul
of the man whom they are seizing and initiating in great rites,
they proceed to return insolence, anarchy, wastefulness, and
shamelessness from exile, in a blaze of light, crowned and accompanied by a numerous chorus, extolling and flattering
62.

Republic VIII (cited in note 57).
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them by calling insolence good education; anarchy, freedom;
wastefulness, magnificence; and shamelessness, courage.63
This critique of freedom implies a need for restrictions more severe than are compatible with liberal democracy. We should not
reject the critique categorically, however. We learn from Plato,
not Mill, that the fully developed individual can take various
forms, and that moderate regimes cannot be indifferent to the
range and intensity of those forms. At the same time, Plato's
Socrates reminds us that democracy's toleration of a variety of
human types allows the life of inquiry to flourish also. Liberals
today place too much reliance on toleration, however, with the
result that they blur the distinction between toleration and
approval.
The success of liberal democracy, whose foundations lie in
modern political philosophy, has produced two consequences.
First, we enjoy the benefits of virtually unlimited intellectual inquiry, but the consignment of religion and other accounts of how
one should live to the private sphere, beyond the authority of
government, has led to a regime of tolerance that is often unable
to defend itself against intolerance. Second, the liberal project
has succeeded in minimizing the effect of moral constraints on
individual expression and action, but instead of the flowering of
the intellectual development of the people at large that Mill predicted, we have witnessed less appreciation of true intellectual
diversity of opinion and we have been forced to tolerate cruder
and more offensive expression. We can no longer rely on religious education for the cultivation of moderate habits. And any
attempt by government to give support to such habits runs up
against a widespread distrust of such authority, among First
Amendment scholars64 as well as the population at large.
Returning to the Supreme Court, I do not think that every
major decision in the area of freedom of speech was wrongly decided and needs to be overturned. I do think, however, that the
ramifications of the Brandenburg "incitement" test, which includes the subjective "clear and present danger" as well as the
objective "incitement to imminent violence," components, have
not been fully considered. Interpreted fairly, the test makes government wait too long before it can take appropriate action
against serious threats to national security or public safety.6s In
63. Id. at 239 (560c-561b).
64. See Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry at 81 (cited in note 37).
65. The Court's decision in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), sustaining the regulation permitting the Secretary of State to revoke a passport on national security grounds,
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addition, an inflexible application of the "content neutrality"
doctrine to government action in all contexts, including public
education, gives the impression that government is unable to
stand for anything. And fmally, surely not every form of communication of a message, be it profanity in the street or nude dancing, should receive the high level of protection that Meiklejohn
or Mill would apply to citizen deliberation on governmental matters.66 Since many of these cases involve "blowing off steam"
which offends a given community, would not a balancing of interests test be more appropriate?67
If we wish to strengthen liberal constitutionalism, we must
be sure that our treatment of freedom of speech gives due weight
to the claims of individual rights. But those claims should be
considered with a realistic appreciation of the benefits of freedom of speech in liberal democracy along with a recognition of
the importance of civility among the citizenry and responsibility
in the political branches of government.

was right, since former agent Agee was planning to expose CIA agents, but did it pass the
Brandenburg test? After including the case in his book, Gerald Gunther, a strong supporter of freedom of speech, asks whether Brandenburg should be applied "to the communication of information that may lead to criminal acts." Gunther, Constitutional Law
at 1066 (cited in note 11 ).
66. See Justice Stevens opinions in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976) and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
67. In a recent book which challenges the conventional wisdom, Robert Nagel argues that "the use of principle requires courts to protect speech even in cases in which the
immediate advantages are questionable and the social disadvantages are clear." He
doubts "that courts actually promote free speech by engaging in principled decision making." Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review 39, 40 (U. of Calif. Press, 1989). While I find his approach refreshing, I think
the Supreme Court can promote free speech and free government by engaging in a full
and candid balancing of governmental interests against free speech claims.

